{"id":1534,"date":"2025-10-14T13:23:12","date_gmt":"2025-10-14T17:23:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/?p=1534"},"modified":"2026-07-07T14:36:46","modified_gmt":"2026-07-07T18:36:46","slug":"no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/","title":{"rendered":"\u201cNo Angel\u201d: Sun Tzu on the Russia-Ukraine War and Zelensky\u2019s\u00a0Quagmire"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>[et_pb_section fb_built=&#8221;1&#8243; _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;_initial&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][et_pb_row _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][et_pb_column type=&#8221;4_4&#8243; _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][et_pb_text _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; link_text_color=&#8221;#666666&#8243; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;]<\/p>\n<p>Open Access | First published online June 2025 | ISSN: 3066-8336| <a href=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/\" title=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.63470\/DETN8897\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.63470\/DETN8897<\/a><\/p>\n<p>[\/et_pb_text][et_pb_text _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.7&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; hover_enabled=&#8221;0&#8243; sticky_enabled=&#8221;0&#8243;]<\/p>\n<div class=\"single-top-bar\">\n<ul class=\"top-bar-menu\" style=\"display:flex; align-items:center; flex-wrap:wrap; list-style:none; margin:0; padding:0; gap:10px;\">\n<li style=\"display:flex; align-items:center;\"><a href=\"#contents\" style=\"color:#333333 !important; font-weight:900 !important; font-size:13px !important; text-decoration:none !important; font-family:'Open Sans',Arial,sans-serif !important; display:flex; 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_module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; custom_margin=&#8221;-25px||||false|false&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][et_pb_column type=&#8221;4_4&#8243; _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][et_pb_text _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; custom_margin=&#8221;8px||8px||false|false&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;]<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\">\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/chunjuan-nancy-wei\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\"><strong>Chunjuan Nancy Wei<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong><span style=\"font-weight: 400;\">Assistant Professor in Political Science, Wenzhou\u2013Kean University<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>[\/et_pb_text][et_pb_button button_url=&#8221;https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/07\/IJPPL-DOI-10.63470-DETN8897.pdf&#8221; url_new_window=&#8221;on&#8221; 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text_font=&#8221;&#8211;et_global_body_font||||||||&#8221; custom_margin=&#8221;-45px||-8px||false|false&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;]<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\"><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\"><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\"><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<div id=\"ez-toc-container\" class=\"ez-toc-v2_0_85 counter-hierarchy ez-toc-counter ez-toc-white ez-toc-container-direction\">\n<div class=\"ez-toc-title-container\">\n<p class=\"ez-toc-title ez-toc-toggle\" style=\"cursor:pointer\">Contents<\/p>\n<span class=\"ez-toc-title-toggle\"><a href=\"#\" class=\"ez-toc-pull-right ez-toc-btn ez-toc-btn-xs ez-toc-btn-default ez-toc-toggle\" aria-label=\"Toggle Table of Content\"><span class=\"ez-toc-js-icon-con\"><span class=\"\"><span class=\"eztoc-hide\" style=\"display:none;\">Toggle<\/span><span class=\"ez-toc-icon-toggle-span\"><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" class=\"list-377408\" width=\"20px\" height=\"20px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" fill=\"none\"><path d=\"M6 6H4v2h2V6zm14 0H8v2h12V6zM4 11h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2zM4 16h2v2H4v-2zm16 0H8v2h12v-2z\" fill=\"currentColor\"><\/path><\/svg><svg style=\"fill: #999;color:#999\" class=\"arrow-unsorted-368013\" xmlns=\"http:\/\/www.w3.org\/2000\/svg\" width=\"10px\" height=\"10px\" viewBox=\"0 0 24 24\" version=\"1.2\" baseProfile=\"tiny\"><path d=\"M18.2 9.3l-6.2-6.3-6.2 6.3c-.2.2-.3.4-.3.7s.1.5.3.7c.2.2.4.3.7.3h11c.3 0 .5-.1.7-.3.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7zM5.8 14.7l6.2 6.3 6.2-6.3c.2-.2.3-.5.3-.7s-.1-.5-.3-.7c-.2-.2-.4-.3-.7-.3h-11c-.3 0-.5.1-.7.3-.2.2-.3.5-.3.7s.1.5.3.7z\"\/><\/svg><\/span><\/span><\/span><\/a><\/span><\/div>\n<nav><ul class='ez-toc-list ez-toc-list-level-1 eztoc-toggle-hide-by-default' ><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-1\" href=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/#Abstract\" >Abstract<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-2\" href=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/#Introduction\" >Introduction<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-3\" href=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/#Alliance_Veto_Player_and_the_Patrons_Dilemma\" >Alliance, Veto Player, and the Patron\u2019s Dilemma<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-4\" href=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/#P1_Know_Your_Enemy_and_Know_Yourself\" >P1: Know Your Enemy and Know Yourself<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-5\" href=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/#P2_Dont_Enter_into_Alliances_Unless_You_Know_the\" >P2: Don\u2019t Enter into Alliances Unless You Know the<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-6\" href=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/#Designs_of_Your_Potential_Allies\" >Designs of Your Potential Allies<\/a><\/li><li class='ez-toc-page-1 ez-toc-heading-level-4'><a class=\"ez-toc-link ez-toc-heading-7\" href=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/#Conclusion_The_Cost_of_Ignoring_Strategic_Prudence\" >Conclusion: The Cost of Ignoring Strategic Prudence<\/a><\/li><\/ul><\/nav><\/div>\n<h4 style=\"line-height: .1;\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Abstract\"><\/span><strong>Abstract<\/strong><span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p><em>Ukraine\u2019s path to peace remains uncertain as the Russia-Ukraine War enters its fourth year. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky faces a four-pronged crisis\u2014military, political, economic, and diplomatic\u2014that has significantly weakened his country\u2019s strategic position. Despite continued resistance, prolonged conflict has placed Ukraine in an increasingly precarious situation. Further, President Trump criticized the Ukrainian leader for being \u201cno angel\u201d in the war and pulled a diplomatic Kabul stunt on Ukraine. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth delivered a three-no\u2019s outline in Brussels, stating that Ukraine\u2019s NATO membership is not realistic, that its border with Russia cannot go back to the pre-2014 line, and that the U.S. is not sending boots on the ground. From a blameless national hero to today\u2019s abandoned pawn, Zelensky and his country have experienced a dramatic roller coaster in global politics in the last three years. Where did things go wrong for Zelensky and Ukraine? What led to this four-pronged crisis? Does Trump\u2019s criticism hold merit?<\/em><\/p>\n<p><em>This article examines Zelensky\u2019s strategic decisions through the lens of Sun Tzu\u2019s <\/em>The Art of War<em>, alongside alliance theory, particularly the risks associated with the <strong>patron\u2019s dilemma<\/strong>. The first section explores alliance theory, particularly the dangers of the patron\u2019s dilemma. The analysis applies two key principles from <\/em>The Art of War<em>: \u201cKnow your enemy and know yourself\u201d and \u201cDon\u2019t Enter into Alliances Unless You Know the Designs of Your Potential Allies\u201d\u2014labeled <strong>P1 and P2 respectively<\/strong>\u2014to assess Ukraine\u2019s strategic miscalculations. This case study provides valuable insights for smaller states navigating great-power politics, highlighting the risks of overreliance on external allies. The paper concludes by emphasizing the importance of strategic prudence for weaker powers caught in great-power competition.<\/em><\/p>\n<p><strong>Keywords:<\/strong> Sun Tzu\u2019s <em>Art of War<\/em>; Vladimir Putin; Volodymyr Zelensky; Donald Trump; Patron\u2019s Dilemma.<\/p>\n<p>[\/et_pb_text][et_pb_divider color=&#8221;#05347E&#8221; _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; custom_margin=&#8221;25px||||false|false&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][\/et_pb_divider][et_pb_text _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; text_font=&#8221;&#8211;et_global_body_font||||||||&#8221; custom_margin=&#8221;-45px||-8px||false|false&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;]<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"top1\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\"><strong style=\"font-size: 16px;\"><\/strong><\/p>\n<h4 style=\"line-height: .1;\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Introduction\"><\/span><strong style=\"font-size: 16px;\">Introduction<\/strong><strong><\/strong><span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>Ukraine\u2019s path to peace looks grim and uncertain. As the Russia-Ukraine War is heading toward its fourth year, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky finds himself in a quadruple crisis. Militarily, his troops are losing on the eastern frontlines as Russia\u2019s winter offensives continue to gain ground. Data from the Washington-based Institute for the Study of War (ISW) indicate that Russia seized nearly 4,000 km2 of Ukrainian territory in 2024 alone\u2014albeit at a huge cost in human lives\u2014including 610 km2 in October, 725 km2 in November, and 593 km2 in December. In the first month of 2025, Moscow has taken nearly 500 km2, along with the resource-rich transportation hub of Kurakhove in the war-torn region of Donetsk.<a href=\"#sec1\">[1]<\/a> Given this speed, Russia has little incentive to stop its military operations. Thus far, Ukraine has lost not only two northern oblasts rich in rare earths<a href=\"#sec2\">[2]<\/a> (Luhansk and Donetsk) but also two additional southern coastal oblasts (Zaporizhzhia and Kherson). Now its fifth oblast, Dnipropetrovsk, is within ranges of Russian military advancement.<a href=\"#sec3\">[3]<\/a> Coupled with Crimea, which was lost in 2014, a quarter of Ukraine\u2019s 1991 territory\u2014home to much of its Soviet-era industrial base\u2014is now in Moscow\u2019s hands. Military failures are certainly taking a toll on the morale of Ukrainian forces and the societal moods.<\/p>\n<p>Politically, the once-glorified Zelensky is now under intense pressure. As expected, the more Russia advances, the less popular the 47-year-old leader gets. His approval rating has slipped from 90 percent in March 2022 to only 52 percent in December 2024. At the same time, the percentage of population that does not trust him has increased from 7 to 39 percent.<a href=\"#sec4\">[4]<\/a> A poll conducted by the Social Monitoring Center in Kyiv finds that only 16 percent of citizens would vote to re-elect him for a second term, and about 60 percent would prefer Zelensky not to even stand for re-election.<a href=\"#sec5\">[5]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>The danger of Zelensky\u2019s political future does not only come from internal sources; it also encounters external pressures. His five-year term of office would have expired in peacetime on May 20, 2024, but the martial law imposed as a result of Russian invasion allows him to stay in office with no term limit so long as the war proceeds. It is no surprise that Putin has termed him \u201cillegitimate\u201d since then, calling for new elections. Further challenges for Zelensky came from U.S. President Donald Trump. In Trump\u2019s first sit-down interview with the media since he returned to the White House, the U.S. president rebuked his Ukrainian counterpart for war, saying he is \u201cno angel\u201d and \u201cshouldn\u2019t have allowed this war to happen\u201d in the first place,<a href=\"#sec6\">[6]<\/a> 6a significant departure from his predecessor Joe Biden who blamed everything on Russia instead. Further, the Trump administration has echoed Putin\u2019s call for elections that could potentially replace Zelensky.<a href=\"#sec7\">[7]<\/a> A former Ukrainian minister interprets the development as \u201cthe first evidence\u201d that Putin and Trump both \u201cwant Zelensky out.\u201d<a href=\"#sec8\">[8]<\/a><\/p>\n<h5 id=\"top2\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p>Economically, Ukraine is proved a sore loser of this three-year-long proxy war. Under Zelensky\u2019s leadership, Ukraine has been gradually pushed into a desperate situation. Economic and civilian infrastructures\u2014industries, power grids, highways, ports and bridges, along with medical, cultural, and educational facilities\u2014are damaged or destroyed; half of natural resources are under Russian control; and fatigue is growing in his war-battered country. Without the power grid, Ukraine\u2019s winter is unlivable. Hundreds of thousands of young, healthy men have been killed or wounded, and millions of women and children have fled to other countries. A year ago, the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank estimated Ukraine\u2019s cost of reconstruction and recovery after two years of war to be around $486 billion,<a href=\"#sec9\">[9]<\/a> more than double the country\u2019s pre-war GDP of less than $200 billion (2021). A new release this year would certainly add at least additional billions of reconstruction cost to account for the damage incurred in the third year of war. President Trump has implemented a 90-day freeze on military, economic, and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, pending further decisions.<a href=\"#sec10\">[10]<\/a> Ukraine now owes mounting unpayable debts which Trump wanted it to repay using its mineral reserves, or simply tie new aids with Ukraine\u2019s \u201crare earths and other things.\u201d<a href=\"#sec11\">[11]<\/a> A fate of bankruptcy is awaiting the country.<\/p>\n<p>Diplomatically, Zelensky\u2019s dream to join the NATO is shattered after Secretary Hegseth\u2019s bombshell speech (see below); he is under tremendous pressure to make concessions on territory, a core national interest for any country, to end the war via negotiations with Russia. At the 2024 Munich Security Conference (MSC) in Germany, then-U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken made a powerful analogy in blunt language: \u201cIf you are not at the table in the international system, you\u2019re going to be on the menu.\u201d<a href=\"#sec12\">[12]<\/a> Zelensky likely recalled these words when news broke that Putin and Trump had agreed to meet in Saudi Arabia to negotiate Ukraine\u2019s future\u2014without inviting either Zelensky or European leaders. He could do little when Trump has radically altered American foreign policy toward Russia at the expense of Ukraine. The news of Trump-Putin talks raises alarm among Ukrainian frontline soldiers and commanders, further shaking their conviction to fight.<a href=\"#sec13\">[13]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>The walls are closing in and the moment of truth has arrived. The longer Ukraine fights, the more territory it loses, and the poorer the country gets. From a hero to an \u201cobstacle\u201d to peace, Zelensky\u2019s standing is falling fast in the United States. At the start of the Russian invasion in February 2022, he was widely hailed as Ukraine\u2019s Winston Churchill\u2014though he disliked the comparison<a href=\"#sec14\">[14]<\/a>\u2014giving speeches from capital to capital receiving standing ovations wherever he went because he stood up as an icon of resistance against Russian invasion. Today, he remains steadfast in his denunciation of Russia and its leader Vladimir Putin, yet he is treated as a hardliner who refused to negotiate. His erstwhile partners and financiers now become silent or turned against him. Political winds have drastically shifted in Washington with Trump\u2019s return, which will undoubtedly affect the global atmosphere that Zelensky needs to operate in. It is much colder than he had expected.<br \/>Zelensky now faces a grim reality: Ukraine may end up worse off than Afghanistan, the last misadventure of the U.S. foreign policy. While the Afghan people retained their country, Ukraine stands to lose at least 20 percent of its territory\u2014and possibly more. Where did things go wrong for Zelensky and Ukraine? What led to this four-pronged crisis? Does Trump\u2019s criticism of Zelensky hold merit?<\/p>\n<p>This article analyzes Zelensky\u2019s role in the war through the lens of Sun Tzu\u2019s <em>The Art of War<\/em>. The first section explores alliance theory, particularly the dangers of the patron\u2019s dilemma. The following sections apply two key principles from Sun Tzu\u2014labeled P1 and P2\u2014to assess Ukraine\u2019s strategic missteps. This case study offers valuable lessons for weaker nations caught in great-power competition, highlighting the risks and consequences of overreliance on external allies.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"top3\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\"><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<h4 style=\"line-height: .1;\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Alliance_Veto_Player_and_the_Patrons_Dilemma\"><\/span><strong>Alliance, Veto Player, and the Patron\u2019s Dilemma<\/strong><span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>As Carl von Clausewitz famously asserted, war is not merely about killing and destruction; it is a means to achieve political objectives.<a href=\"#sec15\">[15]<\/a> At the heart of the Russia-Ukraine war is the latter\u2019s aspiration to join the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a move that Russia has vehemently opposed. Before Trump, successive U.S. administrations publicly endorsed Ukraine\u2019s NATO membership, formalizing this stance at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. The essence of this contest is that Russia demands to be a veto player while pre-Trump-II U.S. and its NATO allies denied Russia this role by reiterating \u201cNATO\u2019s Open Door Policy.\u201d<a href=\"#sec16\">[16]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Typically, in an alliance, the strong partner fears entrapment while the weak, abandonment. Facing security threats, the patron decides whether to grant a potential client a formal ally status or simply providing arms, with the former implying a serious commitment while the latter a much weaker tone. This is because alliances that last are mostly asymmetric, and asymmetric alliance creates dependence. Their strategic bargains lead to two types of \u201cpathologies,\u201d undercommitment and overdependence.<a href=\"#sec17\">[17]<\/a> The patron faces a dilemma in its relationship with the client, with \u201c[s]trong commitments worsen[ing] the risk of entrapment, whereas weak commitments intensify fears of abandonment.\u201d<a href=\"#sec18\">[18]<\/a> Undercommitment displayed by the strong ally precedes abandonment, and it creates anxieties and abandonment fears in the other. The Trump Administration\u2019s rhetoric and deeds, including the president\u2019s phone calls with Putin and Secretary Hegseth\u2019s messages in Brussels, are interpreted as attempted abandonment, while Biden\u2019s Administration\u2019s provision of arms, not NATO membership, to Ukraine was viewed as undercommitment, using the wording of Victor Cha.<a href=\"#sec19\">[19]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>The United States, as the leader of \u201cthe free world,\u201d has a global presence, leading a series of global alliances, from the multilateral organization like the NATO to the bilateral ones with South Korea, Japan, and Israel. It must act strong on Ukraine\u2019s membership in order to sustain its reputation and to deter further aggression, but it always faces a delicate balancing act as alliance relations have significant spill-over effect. As scholars of alliance politics would tell us, strong commitment by Washington could lead to entrapment by a reckless junior partner into an unwanted war or conflict. Those familiar with U.S. diplomatic history would recall President Eisenhower once warned the U.S. not to allow its allies to \u201cmak[e] a sucker out of Uncle Sam.\u201d<a href=\"#sec20\">[20]<\/a> On the other hand, a weak commitment could engender feelings of abandonment on the part of the client such as South Korea\u2019s Syngman Rhee who refused to sign on the armistice agreement that ended the Korean War. Both undercommitment and overdependence could lead to a weakened alliance as trust breaks down.<a href=\"#sec21\">[21]<\/a> A stronger U.S. commitment to Kyiv could also produce a frosty U.S.-Russian relation. A weaker commitment leaves Kyiv feeling unsupported, producing incentives for the latter to seek rapprochement with Moscow. The real test to Washington\u2019s commitment lies not in rhetoric but in action. This gap between stated policy and strategic behavior defines America\u2019s power play.<a href=\"#sec22\">[22]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Ukraine\u2019s eventual membership is to be determined by the result of the multi-layered bargaining between Washington and Moscow, and among the NATO allies. In any case, Ukraine is sandwiched and has to endure the punches from all sides. This is not a smart situation to be in, but Ukrainian leaders of the last decade unfortunately or unwittingly brought it to themselves. Ukraine\u2019s situation is a typical scenario described by the well-known Kenyan proverb, \u201cwhen elephants fight, the grass gets trampled,\u201d or by the less famous Chinese saying, \u201ca fire on the city gate brings disaster to the fish in the moat\u201d (chengmen shihuo, yangji chiyu). Both proverbs are meant to alert us of the negative spill-over effects to the weaker actors in an ecosystem.<\/p>\n<p>Of course, in international relations, weaker states are not the \u201cgrass\u201d or the \u201cfish\u201d that cannot protect themselves. Nation-states, however weak or insignificant, can take strategic actions to avoid, or at least minimize the level of, damage that the external environment may inflict on them. One of history\u2019s most enduring military texts, Sun Tzu\u2019s <em>The Art of War<\/em>, offers crucial insights for leaders navigating asymmetric conflicts. Written near the end of China\u2019s Spring and Autumn period (770-476 BC) to advise King He lu of the State of Wu, the text remains influential worldwide. Today, his teachings and strategies are widely studied, forming the basis of advanced military philosophy across the globe, with both Russian and Ukrainian translations. His most important insight is that knowledge is power\u2014leaders must act independently, prioritizing their own national interests rather than relying excessively on external allies.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"top4\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\"><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<h4 style=\"line-height: .1;\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"P1_Know_Your_Enemy_and_Know_Yourself\"><\/span><strong>P1: Know Your Enemy and Know Yourself<\/strong><span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>While war is not solely about killing and destruction, it does lead to serious mass deaths and destruction, reasons why Sun Tzu started his treatise by stating that \u201cwar is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin.\u201d<a href=\"#sec23\">[23]<\/a> He advises that war is a subject of inquiry which needs to be \u201cthoroughly studied\u201d by national leaders and top generals. Sun Tzu is strongly against gambling on a nation\u2019s future for unattainable goals (for more see P2 below). He emphasizes the importance of meticulous evaluation of one\u2019s possibility of victory long before the war starts. His first principle for decision-makers in any conflict, be it military, economic, or political, is to \u201cknow your enemy and know yourself\u201d (zhi bi zhi ji, 3E:26<a href=\"#sec24\">[24]<\/a>; 10E:34). Demonizing an adversary, as seen in Russophobic narratives, distorts strategic assessments and can lead to misguided decisions that inadvertently strengthen the opponent. He stresses that if one knows neither the enemy nor himself, he will be defeated in every single battle. For that purpose, he specifically lists seven areas for leaders to compare their enemy\u2019s strengths and weaknesses against those of their own, ranging from national political leaders\u2019 qualifications to the military commanders\u2019 personalities, from territorial sizes to states\u2019 economies, from timing to geographical favorability, and from stable supply of weapons to the soldiers\u2019 preparedness in fighting (Chapter 1).<\/p>\n<p>In Chapter 3, Sun Tzu accentuates the importance of political and military decision-makers to a nation\u2019s survival: \u201cthe leader (general) is the bulwark of the State. If the bulwark is complete at all points, the State will be strong. If the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak\u201d (3E:13). If Sun Tzu were advising Ukraine, he would stress the importance of understanding Russian leadership and their perspectives, as this is the foundation of any sound strategy. He would certainly not have treated lightly Putin\u2019s repeated oppositions to Ukraine\u2019s NATO membership,<a href=\"#sec25\">[25]<\/a> certainly not when the latter has amassed sizable military forces on Ukraine\u2019s border, as simply \u201cpropaganda\u201d or \u201csmokescreen\u201d to explain away unpalatable facts. Sun Tzu would have noted Putin\u2019s track record of three successful military adventures in a row\u2014the 2008 war with Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and his 2015 military intervention in Syria that secured Bashar al-Assad for a decade. The planning and executions of these victories would have demonstrated that Putin is a remarkably sophisticated strategist who should never be ignored. In fact, Putin\u2019s annexation of Crimea via referendum in March 2014 with a 97 percent approval rate\u2014a historically Russian territory which Nikita Khrushchev gifted to Ukraine in 1954 when Russia and Ukraine were still republics within the Soviet Union<a href=\"#sec26\">[26]<\/a>\u2014would please Sun Tzu as an application of his philosophy that the \u201csupreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy\u2019s resistance without fighting\u201d (3E:3). Sun Tzu would have noted that the KGB, the main security agency of the Soviet Union from 1954 to 1991, had used his book as training manuals during the Cold War<a href=\"#sec27\">[27]<\/a> and that the intelligence, demeanor, and personality of the former KGB chief\u2014quiet, calm, and calculative\u2014make him a formidable adversary. Echoing Sun Tzu, a <em>New York Times<\/em> article noted: \u201cThere is no world leader today with a better track record when it comes to using military power than President Vladimir V. Putin.\u201d<a href=\"#sec28\">[28]<\/a> Professor John Mearsheimer of Chicago University, the most influential international relations theorist on offensive realism, also referred to Putin as \u201ca first-class strategist.\u201d<a href=\"#sec29\">[29]<\/a><\/p>\n<h5 id=\"top5\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p>Sun Tzu would have pointed out the logic of great power behaviors. The U.S. opposed Russian missiles in Cuba in the 1960s, so why would it assume Russia would accept American and NATO missiles in Ukraine? Like it or not, making foreign policy against the security interests of one\u2019s giant neighbor is to court demise. Sun Tzu would also point out the following passages to Ukrainian leaders. Geopolitical analysts including former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski recognized Ukraine\u2019s importance to Russia. \u201cWithout Ukraine,\u201d he wrote in <em>The Grand Chessboard<\/em>, \u201cRussia ceases to be an empire\u2026\u2026 The loss of Ukraine was geopolitically pivotal, for it drastically limited Russia\u2019s geostrategic options,\u201d<a href=\"#sec30\">[30]<\/a> relegating it to a medium-sized power. Russian political analyst Alexander Dugin, who is called \u201cPutin\u2019s philosopher\u201d in the west, has written many books explaining that Russia\u2019s policy on Ukraine is \u201ceither neutral or ours,\u201d suggesting that neutrality is the maximum that Russia would concede.<a href=\"#sec31\">[31]<\/a> Putin certainly shares that view of Ukraine as an existential interest that he is willing to take great risks to keep within Russia\u2019s sphere of interest. Given this reality, Sun Tzu would likely have advised Ukraine to adopt neutrality as the optimal path for its survival and prosperity. The 2014 Ukrainian translation of <em>The Art of War<\/em> should have served as a guide for strategic decision-making.<\/p>\n<p>Ignoring these geopolitical realities, President Petro Poroshenko led Ukraine to abandon its neutrality status in 2014 and enshrined the ambition of NATO membership in the constitution in 2018\u2014moves that directly contradicted the Minsk Agreements. In March 2021, President Volodymyr Zelensky further inflamed tensions by signing a law mandating the reclamation of Crimea and Sevastopol.<a href=\"#sec32\">[32]<\/a> This author contends that this decision, along with NATO membership aspirations, made war with Russia inevitable.<\/p>\n<p>Unlike his adversary, the Ukrainian leader appeared ill-prepared while navigating an unfamiliar and turbulent geopolitical landscape. He started his acting career when a teenager, gaining popularity via mocking corrupt politicians and their lifestyles. Ironically, the comedian who despised politicians becomes one whose government is being accused of corruption.<a href=\"#sec33\">[33]<\/a> An idealist with little political experience, the President lacks the knowledge base to understand international relations, the salience of statecraft and the ability to navigate in global undercurrents. He inherited a weak hand\u2014a young country fraught with corruption and right in the middle of a low-level war with a powerful neighbor since 2014.<\/p>\n<p>Frequent observations indicate that the Ukrainian leadership underestimated the likelihood of war and was unprepared for its severity. Five incidents should suffice to illustrate why Sun Tzu would have been dismayed by Ukraine\u2019s strategic miscalculations:<\/p>\n<p>1. Underestimating the Enemy. We see how risks of a full-scale war were dismissed, military advice to fortify Ukraine\u2019s borders ignored, and how the president perceived the war, not through the intricacies of global politics but through humanitarian perspectives. Zelensky\u2019s biographer, Simon Shuster, recounted the president\u2019s initial reactions to the war in its early days:<\/p>\n<blockquote><\/blockquote>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">Through his actions before the invasion, Zelensky bore at least some of the blame for the flimsy state of the nation\u2019s defenses. He had spent weeks playing down the risk of a full-scale invasion and he\u2019d refused the advice of military commanders to fortify the border\u2026. Astonishingly, he seemed to believe that if he could only take Putin on a tour of the warzone, if he could let him peer down at the [maimed dead] bodies, the war might stop.<a href=\"#sec34\">[34]<\/a><\/p>\n<blockquote><\/blockquote>\n<h5 id=\"top6\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p>2. Internal Discord. A senior advisor to Zelensky told <em>Time<\/em> magazine in 2023, \u201cHe deludes himself \u2026 We\u2019re out of options. We\u2019re not winning. But try telling him that.\u201d<a href=\"#sec35\">[35]<\/a> This indicates a disconnect between leadership perception and battlefield realities.<\/p>\n<p>3. Fearmongering as Strategy. Zelensky warned the U.S. that the war could escalate into a global conflict, stating, \u201cA third world war could start in Ukraine, continue in Israel, and move on from there to Asia, and then explode somewhere else.\u201d<a href=\"#sec36\">[36]<\/a> His rhetoric, though aimed at securing Western support, lacked an understanding of historical instances where major powers sacrificed smaller states for their own interests. A leader without knowledge of history is dangerous.<\/p>\n<p>4. Misjudging War Duration. Zelensky had an overly optimistic outlook about the war, expecting the conflict to end within a year. In Shuster\u2019s words: \u201cIt was spring 2022, the 55th day of the Russian invasion, and Volodymyr Zelensky asked when I planned to finish my book about him. I told him my aim would be to capture the first year of the war, then publish. His face fell. \u2018You think the war will not be over in a year?\u2019\u201d<a href=\"#sec37\">[37]<\/a> This follows the same optimism as his country marked the first anniversary of the Russian invasion in February 2023. The president boasted on Twitter that 2023 would be a \u201cyear of victory\u201d for Ukraine.<a href=\"#sec38\">[38]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>5. Lack of Enemy Analysis. Sun Tzu would be appalled to have read the remarks by the Head of the Chief Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine\u2019s Defense Ministry, reported in a Ukrainian newspaper in September 2022:<\/p>\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px;\">I never said [the war would last] 2 or 3 weeks. If you remember my statements in late May, I revealed how it would work. I said that in June, we would, unfortunately, suffer certain losses; in July, there would be a relative stalemate; and in August, we would start moving to reclaim our territory. In winter, the war will fade away, to a large extent. After the winter is over, the conflict will start reaching its end; the first stage would be us reaching the administrative borders [of Ukraine] as of 1991.<a href=\"#sec39\">[39]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>War is at least a two-player chess game. His remarks made no reference to Russian strategy, how that would affect his side\u2019s response, and how the interaction could alter the trajectory of the war, illustrating a lack of comprehensive military assessment. In fact, the intelligence chief boasted repeatedly that the Ukrainian military would soon be able to liberate Crimea to reclaim all its 1991 borders.<a href=\"#sec40\">[40]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>These examples suggest that Ukrainian leadership neither understood their enemy nor themselves. But a final question remains: do they truly understand their allies?<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h4 style=\"line-height: .1;\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"P2_Dont_Enter_into_Alliances_Unless_You_Know_the\"><\/span><strong>P2: Don\u2019t Enter into Alliances Unless You Know the <\/strong><span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<h4 style=\"line-height: .1;\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Designs_of_Your_Potential_Allies\"><\/span><strong>Designs of Your Potential Allies<\/strong><span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>Sun Tzu rarely repeats himself, yet he emphasizes Principles 1 and 2 twice, signaling their utmost importance. He states: \u201cWe cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors\u201d (buzhi zhuhou zhi mou zhe buneng yu jiao 7:13; 11:56). This means every country has a set of distinct interests that may be different from yours. Alliances in warfare are essential, but potential partners often have their own agendas and may use deceitful tactics (\u201cAll warfare is based on deception\u201d 1E:23). It is therefore crucial to understand their true interests, motivations, and even ulterior motives. Without a thorough grasp of the past, the present, and even future trajectory of a potential ally or the decision rules of a bloc of allies, partnership may collapse, leaving you the worst loser in the whole game. History books are filled with countless examples of such tales.<\/p>\n<p>State-to-state relationship faces an unsurmountable ceiling: self-interest or self-survival. Alliance theory suggests that key NATO allies, like the United States, fear entrapment in an unwanted war. Zelensky should have asked himself these two fundamental questions: \u201cWhy would NATO risk a conventional war with Russia to admit Ukraine?\u201d and \u201cWould they risk a nuclear war?\u201d History has already shown that great powers\u2014including the United States\u2014think carefully before engaging Russia in a conventional war even when vital national interests are at stake. Napoleon and Hitler\u2019s misadventures serve as stark warnings. Similarly, Russia has long opposed Ukraine\u2019s NATO membership precisely because it fears encirclement. The fact that it has taken Russia three years to occupy only a quarter of Ukraine highlights the difficulty of the conflict, but no country today would fight a nuclear-armed Russia over Ukraine. NATO\u2019s reluctance to fast-track Ukraine\u2019s membership reflects this hard reality. The West\u2019s only major countermeasure against Russia was economic sanctions. Once those proved ineffective, the outcome of the war became increasingly clear. If Zelensky failed to grasp this, he should have at least prepared for the possibility that Ukraine might be abandoned. This again echoes P1\u2019s reasoning: Sun Tzu would likely have advised Ukraine to remain neutral and trade with both the EU and Russia.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"top7\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p>The real problem is that Ukraine\u2019s leadership refused to face reality in its geopolitical constraints. Instead, they allowed themselves to be misled by the Biden administration, whose goal was to weaken Russia\u2019s great power status through a proxy war.<a href=\"#sec41\">[41]<\/a> After the initial shocks following Russia\u2019s invasion, Zelensky eventually understood the relationship between his country and the NATO allies as a partnership in the war. He told the Americans in one of his speeches, \u201cYou\u2019re giving money. We\u2019re giving our lives.\u201d<a href=\"#sec42\">[42]<\/a> But can this modus vivendi be trusted? Three examples in the form of questions should suffice to illustrate its flaws, which will undoubtedly harm any war strategy:<\/p>\n<p>First, Sun Tzu advises the weak to use surprise tactics on the battlefield: \u201cLet your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt\u201d (7E:20). Ukraine has been relying on the United States, the EU, and the G7 for military and economic aid since the beginning of the war. When these allies publicly announce the types and quantities of weaponry they are sending\u2014often to score political points\u2014how could you achieve any potential surprise effect on the battlefield?<\/p>\n<p>Second, if you rely on foreign funding and weapons, can they be delivered in the necessary quantity, quality, and timeframe to counter Russia\u2019s logistical advantage? If not, what leverage do you have? The fact is that Kyiv has no guarantees on any of these fronts. Russia produces and delivers its own weaponry for the battlefield needs while Ukraine must constantly adjust its strategy based on whatever weapons and ammunitions it receives\u2014if any. Even the best commander in history could not produce a victory under such constraints. In reality, Ukraine\u2019s counteroffensive was doomed from the onset. It could not go as planned because structural reasons in the U.S. and European Union blocked a promised military assistance package for months in 2023 and 2024. In a high-profiled speech at Oxford University, EU Vice-President Josep Borrell blamed \u201cpolitical polarization\u201d in the U.S. Congress and the sabotage of Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orb\u00e1n for the significant delay in sending the assistance packages to Ukraine. \u201cIn a Union governed by unanimity,\u201d lamented Borrell, \u201c[the EU\u2019s] policies on Russia are always threatened by a single veto.\u201d<a href=\"#sec43\">[43] <\/a>By providing inadequate military aid and not in a timely fashion, the West effectively leaves Ukraine alone to fight with a much more formidable foe. These are all signs of undercommitment from Washington and Brussels, signaling an acute collective action problem.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"top8\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p>Third, does Ukraine have the manpower to sustain a war against an enemy five times its population? Journalist Simon Shuster, who spent a year with the Ukrainian president and his team, wrote that Zelensky at times \u201c[felt] betrayed by his Western allies\u201d and suspected that \u201cthey have left him without the means to win the war, only the means to survive it.\u201d<a href=\"#sec44\">[44]<\/a> He recalled that one officer complained that \u201c[the frontline commanders] don\u2019t have the men or the weapons\u201d and wondered in frustration \u201cWhere are the weapons? Where is the artillery? Where are the new recruits?\u201d<a href=\"#sec45\">[45]<\/a> One of Zelensky\u2019s close aides told Shuster that even if the U.S. and its allies delivered the weapons in time, \u201cwe don\u2019t have the men to use them.\u201d<a href=\"#sec46\">[46]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>When the long-expected counteroffensive failed and Ukraine\u2019s strategy altered from offense to defense, the Biden Administration also shifted from promising to back Zelensky for \u201cas long as it takes\u201d to providing support \u201cas long as we can\u201d<a href=\"#sec47\">[47]<\/a>\u2014a sign of waning commitment. Despite that, Ukrainians blindly trusted the U.S. and now they, along with the Europeans, are being thrown under the bus by the Trump Administration\u2014a sign of imminent abandonment. At the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, a day before the MSC in 2025, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth delivered three blunt messages in Brussels regarding the new government\u2019s Ukraine policy: 1) Ukraine cannot return to its pre-2014 borders and must accept territorial losses; 2) Ukraine will not join NATO; and 3) American troops will not be sent to Ukraine under any peace deal.<a href=\"#sec48\">[48]<\/a> The day after delivering these messages, Hegseth stated in a press conference that the policy shift was based on \u201ca recognition of hard power realities on the ground,\u201d<a href=\"#sec49\">[49]<\/a> a tacit admission that the West has lost the proxy war in the battlefield.<a href=\"#sec50\">[50]<\/a> Further, the Hegseth Outlines dovetailed with the Russian demand for peace, effectively declaring that Kyiv\u2019s NATO dream is dashed and the tide in the United States has turned against Ukraine. As Hegseth bluntly put it, \u201cchasing the illusionary goals only prolong the war and cause more suffering.\u201d<a href=\"#sec51\">[51]<\/a> Now that Boris Johnson and Joe Biden are out of office, Zelensky has no one to blame for Ukraine\u2019s predicament but himself.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"top9\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p>Did Ukraine do its homework on NATO before they rushed to enshrine this goal into their constitution? Lord Ismay, NATO\u2019s first Secretary General, famously uttered that the purpose of NATO was to \u201ckeep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.\u201d<a href=\"#sec52\">[52]<\/a> Let that sink in. NATO membership follows a unanimity rule and one without the U.S. approval is unthinkable. After the Hegseth Outlines, Ukraine\u2019s defense minister Rustem Umierov ignored his message, stating that \u201c[Ukrainians] have to get used to all kinds of statements. Our position has always remained unchanged. We want to be a NATO country. We will be a NATO country.\u201d<a href=\"#sec53\">[53]<\/a> He refused to believe that the game\u2014which started during the Bush Jr. Administration\u2014is over, suggesting how delusional the country\u2019s top leadership has become.<\/p>\n<p>Ukrainian leaders underappreciated the structural reasons behind their allies\u2019 unpredictability. First, states have different national interests, and no alliance lasts forever\u2014another reason why countries must prioritize self-reliance. The 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston famously stated, \u201cWe have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.\u201d<a href=\"#sec54\">[54]<\/a> His axiom aligns with Sun Tzu\u2019s strategic caution: \u201cMove not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical\u201d (12E:17).<\/p>\n<p>Second, national security is largely subjective, shaped by political perspectives and external circumstances. Multiple authors have frequently pointed out: \u201cNational security, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.\u201d<a href=\"#sec55\">[55]<\/a> Is Russia a threat to U.S. national security? Different factions in the U.S. have provided starkly different answers. Polls indicate that Democrats are three times more likely than Republicans to view Russia as an enemy.<a href=\"#sec56\">[56]<\/a> While former President Biden defined Russia as a national security threat,<a href=\"#sec57\">[57]<\/a> President Trump has taken a markedly different stance.<a href=\"#sec58\">[58]<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Third, the volatility of electoral cycles exacerbates alliance instability. Western democracies, including the U.S., hold elections every four to five years, with parliaments changing even more frequently. Each new administration appoints a different set of cabinet members, who may redefine national security priorities\u2014often shifting policy directions in ways that contradict their predecessors, including on the Russia-Ukraine War. This political turnover makes long-term commitments less reliable, underscoring the risks of overreliance on external allies.<\/p>\n<p>The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that Ukraine did not fully understand its enemy, itself, or the fickleness of its allies. In an interview, Trump criticized Zelensky for \u201cwanting to fight the war despite massive military deficiencies\u201d<a href=\"#sec59\">[59]<\/a>\u2014a fair assessment. Sun Tzu warns against engaging a far stronger opponent: \u201cIf equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him\u201d (3E:11). Ukraine should have sought an exit from the war as soon as possible. Instead, Zelensky gambled his country\u2019s future on an unwinnable conflict.<\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\"><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<h4 style=\"line-height: .1;\"><span class=\"ez-toc-section\" id=\"Conclusion_The_Cost_of_Ignoring_Strategic_Prudence\"><\/span><strong>Conclusion: The Cost of Ignoring Strategic <\/strong><strong>Prudence<\/strong><span class=\"ez-toc-section-end\"><\/span><\/h4>\n<p>Sun Tzu\u2019s teachings emphasize the necessity of knowing the enemy and knowing oneself, and the broader strategic environment before committing to war. As analyzed in P1, Ukraine\u2019s failure to heed this principle led to an overestimation of its own strength and a distortion of Russia\u2019s resolve. Instead of pursuing neutrality and balancing its relationships between the West and Russia, Kyiv gambled on NATO membership, triggering Moscow\u2019s aggressive response. Sun Tzu would have advised against provoking a much stronger foe without the certainty of overwhelming support\u2014a mistake Ukraine made by relying on promises rather than hard commitments from the West.<\/p>\n<p>Similarly, P2 stresses another critical lesson from <em>The Art of War<\/em>: alliances should not be formed without a clear understanding of partners\u2019 intentions. Ukraine assumed that NATO\u2019s rhetorical support and arms transfers would translate into unwavering military and political backing. However, as history has repeatedly shown, great powers prioritize their own interests, and Western hesitation\u2014demonstrated in delayed weapons deliveries, political gridlock, and shifting rhetoric\u2014revealed the inherent fragility of Ukraine\u2019s alliance strategy. The recent shift in U.S. policy under the Trump administration underlines Sun Tzu\u2019s warning: \u201cWe cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.\u201d Zelensky\u2019s miscalculation ultimately left Ukraine in a precarious position, abandoned by Washington which never fully committed to his country\u2019s war effort.<\/p>\n<p>The overarching lesson from Sun Tzu\u2019s philosophy is that wars should only be fought when victory is assured through superior strategy, resources, and alliances. Ukraine, failing to heed these principles, has found itself locked in a prolonged conflict with little hope of achieving its original goals. For the West, it is clear that military aid alone cannot substitute for a coherent strategy. In the end, the war serves as a stark reminder that misjudging both enemies and allies can lead to disastrous consequences. Had Ukraine\u2019s leadership embraced a more pragmatic approach\u2014grounded in Sun Tzu\u2019s principles of strategic foresight, alliance management, and self-awareness\u2014it might have avoided the devastating quagmire in which it now finds itself. In that sense, Trump\u2019s \u201cno angel\u201d assertion is of merit.<\/p>\n<p>[\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][et_pb_column type=&#8221;1_3&#8243; _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][et_pb_image src=&#8221;https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-content\/uploads\/2025\/06\/ijppl-Cover-3.png&#8221; title_text=&#8221;ijppl Cover (3)&#8221; _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][\/et_pb_image][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][et_pb_row column_structure=&#8221;2_3,1_3&#8243; _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][et_pb_column type=&#8221;2_3&#8243; _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][et_pb_text _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; link_text_color=&#8221;#666666&#8243; custom_margin=&#8221;-50px||||false|false&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;]<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec1\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><strong>\u00a0\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><strong><\/strong><\/p>\n<p style=\"line-height: .1;\"><strong>Notes<\/strong><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#top1\">[1]<\/a> \u201cRussian advances in Ukraine grew seven-fold in 2024, data shows,\u201d France 24, December 31, 2024, accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/live-news\/20241231-russian-advances-in-ukraine-grew-seven-fold-in-2024-data-shows\">https:\/\/www.france24.com\/en\/live-news\/20241231-russian-advances-in-ukraine-grew-seven-fold-in-2024-data-shows<\/a>; Sarah Shamim, \u201cRussia gained 4,000sq km of Ukraine in 2024. How many soldiers did it lose?\u201d Al Jazeera, January 8, 2025, accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2025\/1\/8\/russia-gained-4000sq-km-of-ukraine-in-2024-how-many-soldiers-did-it-lose\">https:\/\/www.aljazeera.com\/news\/2025\/1\/8\/russia-gained-4000sq-km-of-ukraine-in-2024-how-many-soldiers-did-it-lose<\/a>; Nicole Wolkov, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and George Barros, accessed February 5, 2025, \u201cRussian Offensive Campaign Assessment, February 3, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.understandingwar.org\/backgrounder\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025.\">https:\/\/www.understandingwar.org\/backgrounder\/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-february-3-2025.<\/a><\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec2\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top1\">[2]<\/a> Tom Watling, \u201cMapped: Where are Ukraine\u2019s rare earth mineral resources and why does Trump want them?\u201d The Independent (UK), February 4, 2025, accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/ukraine-trump-rare-minerals-russia-war-b2692067.html\">https:\/\/www.independent.co.uk\/news\/world\/europe\/ukraine-trump-rare-minerals-russia-war-b2692067.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec3\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top1\">[3]<\/a> \u201cRussian army could break through into Dnipropetrovsk region: an expert warns of a threat,\u201d accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/tsn.ua\/en\/ato\/russian-army-could-break-through-into-dnipropetrovsk-region-an-expert-warns-of-a-threat-2736696.html\">https:\/\/tsn.ua\/en\/ato\/russian-army-could-break-through-into-dnipropetrovsk-region-an-expert-warns-of-a-threat-2736696.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec4\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top1\">[4]<\/a> \u201cZelensky Sees Ratings Drop As Ukraine War Nears 4th Year,\u201d AFP, Jan. 7, 2025, accessed February 6, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.barrons.com\/news\/zelensky-sees-ratings-drop-as-ukraine-war-nears-4th-year-af6f6371\">https:\/\/www.barrons.com\/news\/zelensky-sees-ratings-drop-as-ukraine-war-nears-4th-year-af6f6371<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec5\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top1\">[5] <\/a>Marc Bennetts, \u201cHow Zelensky\u2019s popularity has sunk after nearly three years of war,\u201d <em>The Times<\/em>, November 29, 2024, accessed February 9, 2025, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.thetimes.com\/world\/russia-ukraine-war\/article\/zelensky-popularity-poll-fallen-three-years-war-stzqf5bpn\">http:\/\/www.thetimes.com\/world\/russia-ukraine-war\/article\/zelensky-popularity-poll-fallen-three-years-war-stzqf5bpn<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec6\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top1\">[6]<\/a> Maya Mehrara, \u201cDonald Trump Attacks Zelensky: \u2018He\u2019s No Angel,\u2019\u201d Newsweek, Jan. 24, 2025, accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.newsweek.com\/donald-trump-attacks-zelensky-no-angel-ukraine-russia-war-putin-2020103\">https:\/\/www.newsweek.com\/donald-trump-attacks-zelensky-no-angel-ukraine-russia-war-putin-2020103<\/a>; Megan Lebowitz, \u201cTrump suggests Ukraine shouldn\u2019t have fought back against Russia,\u201d NBC, Jan. 24, 2025, accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/politics\/white-house\/trump-suggests-ukraine-not-fought-back-russia-rcna189071\">https:\/\/www.nbcnews.com\/politics\/white-house\/trump-suggests-ukraine-not-fought-back-russia-rcna189071<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec7\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top1\">[7]<\/a> \u201cUkraine\u2019s president fears Donald Trump is keeping him out of the loop,\u201d The Economist, February 12, 2025, accessed February 12, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/europe\/2025\/02\/12\/ukraine-fears-being-cut-out-of-talks-between-america-and-russia\">https:\/\/www.economist.com\/europe\/2025\/02\/12\/ukraine-fears-being-cut-out-of-talks-between-america-and-russia<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec8\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top1\">[8]<\/a> \u201cUkraine freaks out as US and Russia push for elections,\u201d Politico, Feburary 3, 2025, accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/ukraine-freak-out-us-russia-push-election\/\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/ukraine-freak-out-us-russia-push-election\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec9\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top2\">[9]<\/a> \u201cUpdated Ukraine Recovery and Reconstruction Needs Assessment Released,\u201d United Nations, February 15, 2024, accessed February 11, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/ukraine.un.org\/en\/260758-updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released\">https:\/\/ukraine.un.org\/en\/260758-updated-ukraine-recovery-and-reconstruction-needs-assessment-released<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec10\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top2\">[10]<\/a> Maria Varenikova and Constant Me heut, \u201cMany Ukrainian Aid Groups Stop Work After Trump\u2019s Halt on Foreign Assistance,\u201d <em>New York Times<\/em>, accessed February 5, 2025,\u00a0 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/01\/28\/world\/europe\/ukraine-trump-aid-freeze.html\">https:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/2025\/01\/28\/world\/europe\/ukraine-trump-aid-freeze.html<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec11\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top2\">[11]<\/a> Ivana Kottasova , \u201cUkraine\u2019s mineral riches have long been eyed by its allies. Now they may be Trump\u2019s price for military aid,\u201d CNN, February 4, 2025, accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2025\/02\/04\/world\/trump-ukraine-minerals-military-aid-intl\/index.html\">https:\/\/www.cnn.com\/2025\/02\/04\/world\/trump-ukraine-minerals-military-aid-intl\/index.html<\/a>; Dominic Culverwell, \u201cTrump wants Ukraine\u2019s \u2018rare earths\u2019 \u2014 What critical materials does it actually have?\u201d Kyiv Independent, February 4, 2025, accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/trump-wants-ukraines-rare-earths-what-critical-materials-does-ukraine-actually-have\/\">https:\/\/kyivindependent.com\/trump-wants-ukraines-rare-earths-what-critical-materials-does-ukraine-actually-have\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec12\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top2\">[12]<\/a> Antony Blinken\u2019s full speech delivered at the Munich Security Conference on Feb. 17, 2024 can be found here: accessed January 2, 2025,<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.americanrhetoric.com\/speeches\/antonyblinkenmunichsecurityconference2024.htm\">https:\/\/www.americanrhetoric.com\/speeches\/antonyblinkenmunichsecurityconference2024.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec13\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top11\">[13]<\/a> CGTN Europe, \u201cTrump-Putin talks raises alarm among Ukrainian frontline soldiers,\u201d YouTube Shorts, February 15, 2025, accessed February 17, 2025,<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/shorts\/Uq1Bb3rxvlA\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/shorts\/Uq1Bb3rxvlA<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec14\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top2\">[14]<\/a> Zelensky sees Churchill as an \u201cimperialist\u201d and does not like to be compared to the British. Simon Shuster, \u201cI spent a year with Zelensky \u2013 and saw how his personality completely transformed,\u201d Telegraph, January 4, 2024, accessed February 13, 2025,<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/world-news\/0\/year-zelensky-bunker-ukraine-russia-war\/\">https:\/\/www.telegraph.co.uk\/world-news\/0\/year-zelensky-bunker-ukraine-russia-war\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec15\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top3\">[15]<\/a>\u00a0Carl von Clausewitz, <em>On War<\/em>, trans. Michael Howard &amp; Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976\/84).<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec16\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top3\">[16]<\/a> In December 2021, Putin demanded that NATO cease all military activities in Eastern European member states and permanently bar Ukraine from joining the alliance. NATO rejected this demand. A month later, during a meeting in Brussels, alliance leaders issued a statement reaffirming their commitment to NATO\u2019s \u201cOpen Door Policy,\u201d which permits new members through unanimous consent. Russia\u2019s intention to go to war over Ukraine\u2019s NATO membership was revealed in Jens Stoltenberg\u2019s \u201cOpening remarks,\u201d NATO website, September 7, 2023, accessed May 2, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/opinions_218172.htm\">https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/opinions_218172.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec17\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top3\">[17]<\/a>\u00a0Victor D. Cha, <em>Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia<\/em> (Princeton University Press, 2016), 20-21.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec18\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top3\">[18]<\/a>\u00a0Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, Zack Cooper, \u201cTo Arm or to Ally? The Patron\u2019s Dilemma and the Strategic Logic of Arms Transfers and Alliances,\u201d International Security (2016) 41 (2): 90\u2013139, <a href=\"https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1162\/ISEC_a_00250\">https:\/\/doi.org\/10.1162\/ISEC_a_00250<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec19\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top3\">[19]<\/a>\u00a0Cha, <em>Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia<\/em>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec20\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top3\">[20]<\/a> \u201cMemorandum of Conference With President Eisenhower,\u201d Office of the Historian, November 4, 1959, accessed February 15, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/history.state.gov\/historicaldocuments\/frus1958-60v07p1\/d226\">https:\/\/history.state.gov\/historicaldocuments\/frus1958-60v07p1\/d226<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec21\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top3\">[21]<\/a>\u00a0Glenn H. Snyder, \u201cThe Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,\u201d World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (Jul., 1984), pp. 461-495; Cha, Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia, 20-21.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec22\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top3\">[22]<\/a>\u00a0Cha, <em>Powerplay: The Origins of the American Alliance System in Asia<\/em>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec23\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top4\">[23]<\/a> Sun Tzu, <em>The Art of War<\/em>, Trans. Samuel Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 63.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec24\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top4\">[24]<\/a>\u00a0This \u201c3E:26\u201d corresponds to this author\u2019s upcoming bilingual textbook Annotated Sun Tzu\u2019s Art of War, with the former number referring to the actual chapter in English while the latter, to the actual sentence.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec25\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top4\">[25]<\/a>\u00a0This rule applies to the whole article. Vladimir Socor, \u201cPutin warns Ukraine against seeking NATO membership,\u201d <em>Eurasia Daily Monitor<\/em> Vol. 5, Issue 29, February 14, 2008,<br \/>accessed February 11, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/jamestown.org\/program\/putin-warns-ukraine-against-seeking-nato-membership\/\">https:\/\/jamestown.org\/program\/putin-warns-ukraine-against-seeking-nato-membership\/<\/a>; Gabrielle Te trault-Farber and Tom Balmforth, \u201cRussia demands NATO roll back from East Europe and stay out of Ukraine,\u201d Reuters, December 18, 2021.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec26\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top4\">[26]<\/a> Mark Kramer, \u201cWhy Did Russia Give Away Crimea Sixty Years Ago?\u201d Wilson Center, March 19, 2014, accessed February 11, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.wilsoncenter.org\/publication\/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago\">https:\/\/www.wilsoncenter.org\/publication\/why-did-russia-give-away-crimea-sixty-years-ago<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec27\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top4\">[27]<\/a> It was reported that the Soviet spy agency has made Sun Tzu\u2019s <em>The Art of War<\/em> a standard text during the Cold War. It is unclear if President Putin himself has read the book. Mark Hollingsworth, \u201cThe KGB, Sun Tzu and the Art of War,\u201d The New European, June 25, 2023, accessed February 11, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theneweuropean.co.uk\/the-kgb-sun-tzu-and-the-art-of-war\/\">https:\/\/www.theneweuropean.co.uk\/the-kgb-sun-tzu-and-the-art-of-war\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec28\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top4\">[28]<\/a>\u00a0Chris Miller, \u201cWhy Is Putin at War Again?\u201d <em>New York Times<\/em>, Feb. 27, 2022, Section SR, Page 4.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec29\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top4\">[29]<\/a> Thinkers Forum, \u201cExclusive: John Mearsheimer vs. Alexander Dugin: All You Need to Know about China, Russia, and the US,\u201d YouTube Video, 1:06:01, Dec. 10, 2024, accessed February 11, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=Iv02AsNATAg\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=Iv02AsNATAg<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec30\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top5\">[30]<\/a>\u00a0Zbigniew Brzezinski, <em>The Great Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives<\/em> (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 46, 92.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec31\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top5\">[31]<\/a> Thinkers Forum, \u201cExclusive: John Mearsheimer vs Alexander Dugin: All You Need to Know about China, Russia, and the US,\u201d YouTube Video, 01:02:09-01:06:00, Dec. 10, 2024, accessed February 11, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=Iv02AsNATAg\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=Iv02AsNATAg<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec32\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top5\">[32]<\/a>\u00a0The law has a long name titled \u201cOn the Strategy of de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol,\u201d with a Decree \u2116117\/2021, March 24, 2021.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec33\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top5\">[33]<\/a> See how Zelensky\u2019s biographer Simon Shuster described him. Shuster, \u201cI spent a year with Zelensky.\u201d<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec34\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top5\">[34]<\/a>\u00a0Shuster, \u201cI spent a year with Zelensky.\u201d<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec35\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top6\">[35]<\/a> Simon Shuster, \u201c\u2018Nobody believes in our victory like I do.\u2019 Inside Volodymyr Zelensky\u2019s struggle to keep Ukraine in the fight,\u201d<em> Time Magazine<\/em>, November 1, 2023, accessed February 8, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/time.com\/6329188\/ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky-interview\/\">https:\/\/time.com\/6329188\/ukraine-volodymyr-zelensky-interview\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec36\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top6\">[36]<\/a>\u00a0Shuster, \u201c\u2018Nobody believes in our victory like I do.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec37\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top6\">[37]<\/a>\u00a0Shuster, \u201cI spent a year with Zelensky.\u201d<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec38\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top6\">[38]<\/a> \u201cZelensky on anniversary of war in Ukraine: \u2018This will be the year of our victory,\u2019\u201d Le Monde, February 24, 2023, accessed February 5, 2025,<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/en\/international\/article\/2023\/02\/24\/this-will-be-the-year-of-our-victory-says-zelensky-on-anniversary-of-war-in-ukraine_6017096_4.html\">https:\/\/www.lemonde.fr\/en\/international\/article\/2023\/02\/24\/this-will-be-the-year-of-our-victory-says-zelensky-on-anniversary-of-war-in-ukraine_6017096_4.html<\/a>;<br \/>\u201cMiscalculations, divisions marked offensive planning by U.S., Ukraine,\u201d Washington Post, December 4, 2023, accessed February 5, 2025,<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2023\/12\/04\/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war\/\">https:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/world\/2023\/12\/04\/ukraine-counteroffensive-us-planning-russia-war\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec39\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top6\">[39]<\/a> Iryna Balachuk, \u201cHead of Ukrainian Intelligence predicts Ukraine to come back to Crimea by late spring,\u201d Ukrainska Pravda, September 30, 2022, accessed February 5, 2025<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2022\/09\/30\/7369902\/\">https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2022\/09\/30\/7369902\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec40\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top6\">[40]<\/a> Balachuk, \u201cHead of Ukrainian Intelligence\u201d; \u201cUkraine\u2019s Armed Forces to be in Crimea soon \u2013 Defence Intelligence Chief,\u201d Ukrainska Pravda, July 29, 2023, accessed February 5, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2023\/07\/29\/7413330\/\">https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2023\/07\/29\/7413330\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec41\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top7\">[41]<\/a> Multiple analysts have used similar characterization. For example, the most influential U.S. international relations theorist John Mearsheimer has pointed out in a talk in 2022 that \u201cthe Biden administration is committed to knocking Russia out of the ranks of the great powers.\u201d See John J. Mearsheimer, \u201cThe Causes and Consequences of the Ukraine War,\u201d CIRSD, June 16th, 2022, accessed February 22, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.cirsd.org\/en\/horizons\/horizons-summer-2022-issue-no.21\/the-causes-and-consequences-of-the-ukraine-war\">https:\/\/www.cirsd.org\/en\/horizons\/horizons-summer-2022-issue-no.21\/the-causes-and-consequences-of-the-ukraine-war<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec42\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top7\">[42]<\/a>\u00a0Shuster, \u201c\u2018Nobody believes in our victory like I do.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec43\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top8\">[43]<\/a> EEAS Press Team, \u201cUnited Kingdom: Speech by High Representative\/Vice-President Josep Borrell at Oxford University about the world confronted by wars,\u201d EEAS, May 3, 2024, accessed May 11, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/united-kingdom-speech-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-oxford-university-about-world_en\">https:\/\/www.eeas.europa.eu\/eeas\/united-kingdom-speech-high-representativevice-president-josep-borrell-oxford-university-about-world_en<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec44\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top8\">[44]<\/a>\u00a0Shuster, \u201c\u2018Nobody believes in our victory like I do.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec45\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top8\">[45]<\/a>\u00a0Shuster, \u201c\u2018Nobody believes in our victory like I do.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec46\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top8\">[46]<\/a>\u00a0Shuster, \u201c\u2018Nobody believes in our victory like I do.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec47\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top8\">[47]<\/a> Michael Hirsh, \u201cThe Biden Administration Is Quietly Shifting Its Strategy in Ukraine,\u201d Politico, December 27, 2023, accessed February 8, 2025<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/magazine\/2023\/12\/27\/biden-endgame-ukraine-00133211\">https:\/\/www.politico.com\/news\/magazine\/2023\/12\/27\/biden-endgame-ukraine-00133211<\/a>;<br \/>Leo Litra, \u201cThe limits of \u2018as long as it takes\u2019: Why Ukraine\u2019s allies need to update their strategy,\u201d European Council on Foreign Relations, December 19, 2023, accessed February 14, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/article\/the-limits-of-as-long-as-it-takes-why-ukraines-allies-need-to-update-their-strategy\/\">https:\/\/ecfr.eu\/article\/the-limits-of-as-long-as-it-takes-why-ukraines-allies-need-to-update-their-strategy\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec48\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top8\">[48]<\/a> Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth\u2019s opening remarks at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, Feb. 12, 2025 can be accessed here: accessed February 15, 2025,<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.defense.gov\/News\/Speeches\/Speech\/Article\/4064113\/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-ukraine-defense-contact\/\">https:\/\/www.defense.gov\/News\/Speeches\/Speech\/Article\/4064113\/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-ukraine-defense-contact\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec49\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top8\">[49]<\/a> Transcript of Defense Secretary Hegseth\u2019s press conference following NATO Ministers of Defense Meeting in Brussels, Feb. 13, 2025, can be accessed here: accessed February 15, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.defense.gov\/News\/Speeches\/Speech\/Article\/4064113\/opening-remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-at-ukraine-defense-contact\/\">https:\/\/www.defense.gov\/News\/Transcripts\/Transcript\/Article\/4066734\/secretary-of-defense-pete-hegseth-press-conference-following-nato-ministers-of\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec50\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top8\">[50]<\/a> This author concurs with Professor John Mearsheimer of Chicago University (along with two European experts) who stated in the Duran program that the Hegseth quote in effect constitutes a tacit admission of defeat on the battlefield by the Trump Administration. To quote Mearsheimer, \u201cHegseth\u2019s statement at the press conference\u2014\u2018a recognition of hard power realities on the ground\u2019\u2014means that the Trump Administration understands that we [the U.S.] have lost this war; the tide has turned against Ukraine\u201d (39:07-42). Proxy wars are those that allow a state to hurt an adversary without actually declaring war and sending in troops. Senator Lindsey Graham described the nature of the proxy war best. He said in the face of Zelensky at the Munich Security Conference, \u201cI want to tell you and your people, you\u2019re the ally I\u2019ve been hoping for all my life. Not one American has died defending Ukraine. You\u2019ve taken our weapons, and you\u2019ve kicked [the Russian] ass and I\u2019m very proud to have you as our ally\u2026.\u201d See the video and Twitter, UNITED24 Media (@United24media), \u201c\u2018I want to tell you [@ZelenskyyUa] and your people, you\u2019re the ally I\u2019ve been hoping for all my life. You\u2019ve taken our weapons, and you\u2019ve kicked their ass. I\u2019m very proud to have you as our ally.\u2019 \u2014 Senator @LindseyGrahamSC at #MSC2025,\u201d Twitter, February 14, 2025, 11:53, accessed February 22, 2025, https:\/\/x.com\/United24media\/status\/1890429281441927240.The Duran, \u201cTrump To Force Ukraine Peace on Europe &#8211; John Mearsheimer, Alexander Mercouris &amp; Glenn Diesen,\u201d YouTube Video, 39:07-42, Feb. 15, 2025, accessed February 22, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=m5-L5pyXLZQ\">https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=m5-L5pyXLZQ<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#top8\">[51]<\/a> Hegseth\u2019s opening remarks at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, Feb. 12, 2025.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec52\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top9\">[52]<\/a> \u201cNATO Leaders: Lord Ismay,\u201d NATO website, accessed February 15, 2025,<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/declassified_137930.htm\">https:\/\/www.nato.int\/cps\/en\/natohq\/declassified_137930.htm<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec53\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top9\">[53]<\/a> \u201c\u2018We Will Be a NATO Country\u2019\u2013 Defense Minister Stands Firm on Alliance Membership,\u201d Kyiv Post, February 13, 2025, accessed February 14, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/post\/47029\">https:\/\/www.kyivpost.com\/post\/47029<\/a>; Tetyana Vysotska and Valentyna Romanenko, \u201cUkraine wants to be in NATO and it will be, Ukraine\u2019s defence minister says in response to Pentagon chief\u2019s remarks,\u201d Ukrainska Pravda, February 12, 2025, accessed February 14, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2025\/02\/12\/7497998\/\">https:\/\/www.pravda.com.ua\/eng\/news\/2025\/02\/12\/7497998\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec54\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top9\">[54]<\/a> This was part of a speech by Lord Palmerston in the House of Commons, March 1, 1848, quoted from the online version of Susan Ratcliffe (ed.), <em>Oxford Essential Quotations<\/em> (4 ed.) (Oxford University Press, 2016),<br \/><a href=\"https:\/\/www.oxfordreference.com\/display\/10.1093\/acref\/9780191826719.001.0001\/q-oro-ed4-00008130\">https:\/\/www.oxfordreference.com\/display\/10.1093\/acref\/9780191826719.001.0001\/q-oro-ed4-00008130<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec55\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top9\">[55]<\/a> Jan Ellen Lewis, \u201cDefining the Nation: 1790 to 1898,\u201d in <em>Security V. Liberty: Conflicts Between National Security and Civil Liberties in American History<\/em>, edited by Daniel Farber, 117\u201364, Russell Sage Foundation, 2008,<br \/><a href=\"http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/10.7758\/9781610441933.9\">http:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/10.7758\/9781610441933.9<\/a>; Alex Lo, \u201cDemocratic politics in the West is shown to be as fickle as they come,\u201d SCMP, Nov. 16, 2022, accessed February 22, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/comment\/opinion\/article\/3199864\/democratic-politics-west-shown-be-fickle-they-come\">https:\/\/www.scmp.com\/comment\/opinion\/article\/3199864\/democratic-politics-west-shown-be-fickle-they-come<\/a>; Brad Glosserman, \u201cNational security is in the eye of the beholder,\u201d Japan Times, May 11, 2020, accessed February 22, 2025 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/opinion\/2020\/05\/11\/commentary\/world-commentary\/national-security-eye-beholder\/\">https:\/\/www.japantimes.co.jp\/opinion\/2020\/05\/11\/commentary\/world-commentary\/national-security-eye-beholder\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec56\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top9\">[56]<\/a> David Montgomery and Kathy Frankovic, \u201cWhat Americans think about the Russia-Ukraine war as Congress passes Ukraine aid,\u201d YouGov, April 26, 2024, accessed February 22, 2025,\u00a0 <a href=\"https:\/\/today.yougov.com\/politics\/articles\/49253-what-americans-think-about-russia-ukraine-war-aid\">https:\/\/today.yougov.com\/politics\/articles\/49253-what-americans-think-about-russia-ukraine-war-aid<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec57\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top9\">[57]<\/a> \u201cWe don\u2019t walk away from our allies; we stand with them. We don\u2019t let tyrants win; we oppose them. We don\u2019t merely watch global events unfold; we shape them. That\u2019s what it means to be the indispensable nation. That\u2019s what it means to be the world\u2019s superpower and the world\u2019s leading democracy\u201d vowed Biden emphatically last year, adding that \u201cThere is a bipartisan consensus for that kind of American leadership. That\u2019s exactly what we\u2019ll continue to deliver.\u201d<sup> <\/sup>Quote from Biden\u2019s speech \u201cRemarks by President Biden on the Passage of H.R. 815, the National Security Supplemental,\u201d The White House (website), April 24, 2024, accessed May 12, 2024, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefing-room\/speeches-remarks\/2024\/04\/24\/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-passage-of-h-r-815-the-national-security-supplemental\/\">https:\/\/www.whitehouse.gov\/briefing-room\/speeches-remarks\/2024\/04\/24\/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-passage-of-h-r-815-the-national-security-supplemental\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec58\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top9\">[58]<\/a>\u00a0Tim Ross and Jacopo Barigazzi, \u201cTrump\u2019s America is Putin\u2019s ally now,\u201d <em>Politico<\/em>, February 19, 2025, accessed February 22, 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/donald-trump-america-vladimir-putin-ally-war\/\">https:\/\/www.politico.eu\/article\/donald-trump-america-vladimir-putin-ally-war\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<h5 id=\"sec59\"><span style=\"color: f9f6fa;\"><\/span><\/h5>\n<p><a href=\"#top9\">[59]<\/a>\u00a0\u201cDonald Trump Attacks Zelensky: \u2018He\u2019s No Angel,\u2019\u201d <em>Newsweek<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p>[\/et_pb_text][\/et_pb_column][et_pb_column type=&#8221;1_3&#8243; _builder_version=&#8221;4.27.4&#8243; _module_preset=&#8221;default&#8221; global_colors_info=&#8221;{}&#8221;][\/et_pb_column][\/et_pb_row][\/et_pb_section]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Open Access | First published online June 2025 | ISSN: 3066-8336| https:\/\/doi.org\/10.63470\/DETN8897  <div class=\"addtoany_shortcode\"><div class=\"a2a_kit a2a_kit_size_32 addtoany_list\" data-a2a-url=\"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/no-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire\/\" data-a2a-title=\"&#8220;No Angel&#8221;: Sun Tzu on the Russia-Ukraine War and Zelensky&#039;s Quagmire\"><a class=\"a2a_button_facebook\" href=\"https:\/\/www.addtoany.com\/add_to\/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.journal.hji.edu%2F0723NewLayout%2Fno-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire%2F&amp;linkname=%26%238220%3BNo%20Angel%26%238221%3B%3A%20Sun%20Tzu%20on%20the%20Russia-Ukraine%20War%20and%20Zelensky%27s%20Quagmire\" title=\"Facebook\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><a class=\"a2a_button_x\" href=\"https:\/\/www.addtoany.com\/add_to\/x?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.journal.hji.edu%2F0723NewLayout%2Fno-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire%2F&amp;linkname=%26%238220%3BNo%20Angel%26%238221%3B%3A%20Sun%20Tzu%20on%20the%20Russia-Ukraine%20War%20and%20Zelensky%27s%20Quagmire\" title=\"X\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><a class=\"a2a_button_whatsapp\" href=\"https:\/\/www.addtoany.com\/add_to\/whatsapp?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.journal.hji.edu%2F0723NewLayout%2Fno-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire%2F&amp;linkname=%26%238220%3BNo%20Angel%26%238221%3B%3A%20Sun%20Tzu%20on%20the%20Russia-Ukraine%20War%20and%20Zelensky%27s%20Quagmire\" title=\"WhatsApp\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><a class=\"a2a_button_google_gmail\" href=\"https:\/\/www.addtoany.com\/add_to\/google_gmail?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.journal.hji.edu%2F0723NewLayout%2Fno-angel-sun-tzu-on-the-russia-ukraine-war-and-zelenskys-quagmire%2F&amp;linkname=%26%238220%3BNo%20Angel%26%238221%3B%3A%20Sun%20Tzu%20on%20the%20Russia-Ukraine%20War%20and%20Zelensky%27s%20Quagmire\" title=\"Gmail\" rel=\"nofollow noopener\" target=\"_blank\"><\/a><a class=\"a2a_dd addtoany_share_save addtoany_share\" href=\"https:\/\/www.addtoany.com\/share\"><\/a><\/div><\/div> Google Scholar PDF <div class=\"post-views content-post post-1534 entry-meta load-static\">\r\n\t\t\t\t<span class=\"post-views-icon dashicons dashicons-chart-bar\"><\/span> <span class=\"post-views-label\">Post Views:<\/span> <span class=\"post-views-count\">212<\/span>\r\n\t\t\t<\/div> Chunjuan Nancy Wei Assistant Professor in Political Science, Wenzhou\u2013Kean University Abstract Ukraine\u2019s path to peace remains uncertain as the Russia-Ukraine War enters [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":16,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_et_pb_use_builder":"on","_et_pb_old_content":"<!-- wp:divi\/placeholder \/-->","_et_gb_content_width":"1080","footnotes":""},"categories":[9],"tags":[],"post_folder":[],"class_list":["post-1534","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-volume-1"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1534","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/16"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1534"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1534\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2205,"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1534\/revisions\/2205"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1534"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1534"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1534"},{"taxonomy":"post_folder","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.journal.hji.edu\/0723NewLayout\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/post_folder?post=1534"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}